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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Israel now occupies the Sinai peninsula as a result of the June
War of 1967, it would seem, at first glance, that the question of passage
through the Straits of Tiran is settled. That is hardly the case. Israel
occupied the Sinai after the 1956 conflict,' and even the subsequent ten-
year period of United Nations occupation did not prevent the United
Arab Republic from blockading the Straits in 1967.2 One might think,
then, that the solution is for Israel to remain in control of the Sinai.
Despite popular sentiment, however, and the feeling that perhaps
Israel has earned a right to enlarged territory, her occupation of the
Sinai is illegal.3 Israel has expressed a willingness to withdraw from the
peninsula but only on the condition that a permanent settlement is made
with the Arab states, one that would include the settlement of the ques-
tion of passage of Israeli shipping.4 Israel's withdrawal in 1957 had been
conditioned on a guarantee of freedom of passage,5 but the states never
entered into any permanent agreement. It is now clear that Israel will
not withdraw until something greater than a guarantee is offered. It
seems, therefore, that there will be, for the first time, a legal determina-
tion of the issue of passage through the Straits of Tiran. There is thus
a great need to review the factual and legal issues that will be involved
in any such determination.
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. The Arab Israeli Military Confrontation, XI ORaiS 331 (1967).
2. C. Marshall, Reflections on the Middle East, XI ORaBis 343, 355 (1967).
3. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
4. The Arab Israeli Military Confrontation, XI ORBis 331, 332 (1967).
5. Id. at 331.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, war broke out
in the Middle East.6 The active hostilities of that war were terminated
by the Rhodes Armistice.7 After the signing of the Rhodes agreement,
Israel occupied Elath, her only outlet to the Gulf of Aqaba.' Egypt con-
sidered that occupation illegal.9 It has been pointed out, however, that
Jordan rather than Egypt occupied Elath before Israel, and that Israel's
occupation of the city was prior to the signing of an armistice with Jordan,
and therefore not in violation of any existing armistice.' 0
War broke out again in 1956, but subsequent events brought the
Rhodes- Armistice back into existence." After 1957, United Nations
forces remained in control of the Sinai with the consent of the United
Arab Republic and Israel until May of 1967, when Nasser withdrew his
country's consent and established measures against Israeli shipping.' 2 It
is the legality of these measures that is in question.
III. THE RHODES ARMISTICE: TIME OF WAR OR TIME OF PEACE?
A. The Blockade of Israeli Shipping
There seems little question that the absolute blockade of Israeli
shipping"5 was illegal because a blockade established after the signing of
an armistice is considered an act of war and therefore illegal under prin-
ciples of international law.' 4 The United Arab Republic made no spe-
cification as to particular items that would not be permitted to be shipped;
thus, there can be no justification of the measures established against
Israel itself as an exercise of belligerent rights. As to neutral ships, how-
ever, the measures established were the blockading of strategic goods
bound for Israel."5 These measures could be justified as an exercise of a
legitimate belligerent right, if such a right existed under the Rhodes
Armistice.1"
B. The Belligerent Right of Visit and Search
The right of a belligerent to visit and search neutral merchantmen
during a time of war is now axiomatic in international law. Oppenheim
6. Selak, A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 52 AM. J. INTI'L L.
660, 667 (1958).
7. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Signed at Rhodes, Feb. 24, 1949, 42
U.N.T.S. 252, 155 B.F.S.P. 331 (1949).
8. The Trouble About Aqaba, XI-XII EOYPTIAN ECON. & POL. REv. (Feb., 1957).
9. Id.
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See W. O'Brien, International Law and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East,
XI ORBs 692 (1967); J. BRIESuLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 398-402 (6th ed., H. Waldock,
1963).
12. See note 2 supra.
13. Id.
14. See II H. RoLs, LE DRorr MODERNE DE LA GUEREn 805 (1920).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. II OPPEmmm, ImTENATIONAL LAw 848 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 1952).
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states that this right has "long been universally recognized . . . ."" It is
clear, then, that the United Arab Republic had a right of visit and
search, though she did not exercise it, during the period of active hostil-
ities surrounding the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In 1949,
those active hostilities were temporarily ended by the Armistice signed
at Rhodes.18
Whether the measures asserted by the United Arab Republic as to
neutral ships were legal depends on whether the Rhodes Armistice ter-
minated the state of war and, consequently, belligerent rights.
C. Traditional Armistice Law
The significance of an armistice in international law is explained by
Oppenheim thus:
[Armistices] are in no wise to be compared to peace ... because
the condition of war remains between the belligerents them-
selves, and between belligerents and neutrals, on all points
beyond the mere cessation of hostilities ...the right of visit
and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains in-
tact .... 19
Colonel Howard S. Levie, Chief of the International Affairs Division of
the JAG, U.S. Department of the Army, emphasized that "it may be
stated as a positive rule that an armistice agreement does not terminate
the state of war ....
The courts of major world powers have recognized that an armistice
does not end a state of war. The Supreme Court of the United States did
so in Kahn v. Anderson.2 A British court upheld the capturing of a ship
during an armistice and thereby recognized that the agreement did not
end the state of war.22 A French court sentenced a journalist to death
before a firing squad for "communicating with the enemy." The court
rejected the defense that an armistice ends a state of war, and found that
the Germans constituted "the enemy" under the statute despite the exist-
ence of an armistice. 8 In his editorial comments on that case, H. Lauter-
pacht said that it is "in full conformity" with international law that an
armistice leaves a state of war in existence "with all its juridical con-
sequences." 4
17. Id.
18. See note 7 supra.
19. II OPPENHEITM, INTERNATONAL LAW 546 (7th ed., 1952, H. Lauterpacht).
20. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 880,
884 (1956).
21. 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
22. The Rannveig, 1 A. C. 97; 3 B & C. P. C. 1013 (1922), commented on in II
OPIENIrIIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 849 n.1 (7th ed., 1952, H. Lauterpacht).
23. In re Suarez, [1944] Ann. Dig. 412 (France, Court of Cassation, Case No. 140).
24. Id. at 413.
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D. The Rhodes Armistice, a United Nations Armistice
Great significance has been attached to the fact that the Rhodes
Armistice was signed under United Nations auspices, and much argument
has been made, as will be shown, that such an armistice is a break from
traditional practice and, therefore, from traditional law. The argument is
that such an armistice terminates belligerent rights.
It should be noted first that even prior to the formation of the United
Nations, many wars were legally terminated by a cessation of hostilities;
the nations entered into peaceful relations without expressly making
peace. 25 A cessation of hostilities legally established peace in the following
wars: France---Spain (1720); Sweden-Poland (1716); France-Mexico
(1867); Russia-Persia (1801); Spain-Chile 1867).20 Therefore, prece-
dent was established for the legal termination of war through armistices,
and Oppenheim has said that such cessation of hostilities may be treated
"as synonymous with the cessation of war .... ;)27
Traditionally, armistices were totally the products of bargaining
countries; they were analogous to contracts. The Rhodes Armistice, on
the other hand, was imposed from above; that is, it was administered by
the United Nations, and both parties accepted it. The European legal
scholar, R. Monaco, has emphasized that it is necessary to organize an
administrative body to control the relations of the parties to an armistice
during the armistice period.2" Since the parties to the Rhodes Armistice
recognized the United Nations as the administrative body, a strong argu-
ment can be made that official U. N. pronouncements are binding on both
parties, at least until, by declaration of war, either party should renounce
the agreement, or other agreements of peace would be entered into. The
significance of United Nations administration is thus apparent.
In attempting to regulate the relations between the United Arab Re-
public and Israel, the United Nations Security Council, in a 1951 resolu-
tion, interpreted the Rhodes Armistice to have terminated belligerent
rights. The resolution said, in part:
Considering that since the Armistice regime, which has been in
existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent char-
acter, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a
belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit [and]
search ....29
25. P. COBBETT, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, 293 (5th ed., W. Walker, 1937); Tansil,
Termination of War by Mere Cessation of Hostilities, 38 L.Q. REv. 26 (1922) ; Note,
Judicial Determination of the End of the War, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 257 (1947).
26. II OPPENHEItM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 598 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 1952).
27. Id., at 597.
28. R. Monaco, Les Conventions entre Belligerents, 78 RECUEIL DES Covs 277, 343
(1949).
29. [19511 U.N.Y.B. 299, U.N. Doc. S/2322 (1951).
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Many arguments have been raised to say that this resolution is not
determinative of the question of the United Arab Republic's rights in
the Straits of Tiran. First, such an interpretation of the Armistice seems
contrary to the express terms of the agreement itself. Article 1(4) pro-
vides that the agreement is a "step . . . towards . . . the restoration of
peace in Palestine."3 ° This language indicates that the parties did not in-
tend the agreement to end the state of war and bring in a time, and there-
fore the law, of peace. Furthermore, in a time of peace, a warship has
the right of innocent passage through territorial waters of a coastal state.31
The fact that the parties to the Rhodes Armistice expressly denied each
other that right in Article 11 (2) further indicates that they did not intend
to end the state of war or to give up their belligerent rights. On the other
hand, it could be argued that such an express provision shows that the
parties had to bargain for belligerent rights, and the fact that no provision
grants the United Arab Republic the right of visit and search shows that
the United Arab Republic either failed to bargain for it, or did so and
lost.
Secondly, a strong argument is raised that the United Nations is
without the power to make a legal determination of the United Arab
Republic's right to visit and search in the Straits of Tiran. It is argued
that Security Council resolutions are at best recommendations and do
not create law.3 2 The functions of the Security Council include submitting
reports, 33 formulating plans for submission to the General Assembly,34
investigating disputes, 5 and recommending solutions.3 6 That recommenda-
tions do not create law is seen in the following quotation from Goodrich
and Hambro: "it was made clear in the discussions at San Francisco, as
it should be apparent from the wording of the Charter, that such recom-
mendations have no binding force."37 The noted French authority, M. Cas-
sin spoke of the United Nations as "un 'pont' vers la coop6ration, et non
une fin."38 And finally, Colonel Levie frankly recognized the political na-
ture of the 1951 resolution and concluded that it was not likely that the
Security Council was "attempting to change a long established rule of
international law [i.e., that an armistice does not end a state of war.]'"3
30. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Signed at Rhodes, Feb. 24, 1949, 42
U.N.T.S. 252, 155 B.F.S.P. 331 (1949).
31. The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom-Albania) [19411 I.C.J. 4; Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva, 1958, ART. 23, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 13/L. 52.
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 24 para. 3.
33. Id. art. 26.
34. Id. art. 33.
35. Id. art. 34.
36. Id. art. 36.
37. L. GOODRICH and E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OP THE UNITED NATIoNs 122 (1946).
38. The phrase literally means "it is a bridge toward cooperation and not the end."
Coidan, Le Sixi~me Colloque De Droit Spatial, IX ANNUAiRE FRANrAIS DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 1255 (1963).
39. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 880,
886 (1956).
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This argument, though at first convincing, fails for two reasons. As
explained above, the United Nations was accepted by both parties as the
administrative body of the Armistice; its decisions are binding as long as
the armistice period continues. It is clear that Israel has no legal obliga-
tion to withdraw from the Sinai if the Armistice period is not to be re-
instated. With its reinstatement the 1951 resolution should again take
effect. The second reason why the resolution is binding is that it was made
pursuant to article 39, of chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The
significance of such a decision is seen in the following words of Lauter-
pacht: "The decisions of the Security Council made under Chapter VII
of the Charter for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security are binding upon all members of the United Nations."4 Prob-
ably the best argument that the United Arab Republic could make against
the 1951 resolution is that it was made in regard to the Suez, not the
Straits of Tiran. Furthermore, the argument is, such a resolution cannot
be applied to the Straits because the United Nations Charter provides that
legal issues involved in a dispute shall be determined by the International
Court of Justice before a resolution can be made. 41 The legal status of the
Suez Canal, which connects two parts of the high seas, was settled by
treaty.42 But as to the status of the Straits of Tiran, there is a legal dis-
pute4" which will necessarily affect the United Arab Republic's rights in
those waters. No resolution can be made or applied until that dispute is
settled.
Furthermore, limitations placed upon Egypt's rights to the Suez can-
not be freely applied to her rights in the Straits of Tiran because the
signatories of the Constantinople Convention recognized expressly in
article X that the internationalizing of the Suez was in no way to prejudice
Egypt's rights of defense in the Red Sea area.44
Then, the crucial question of the status of the Gulf of Aqaba as it
affects the status of the Straits of Tiran must be settled. If the Gulf and
the Straits are such that international passage can legally be suspended,
obviously the United Arab Republic's measures were legal. If, on the
other hand, the status of these waters is such that passage shall be granted
according to principles of international law, the measures taken by the
United Arab Republic must be within those granted a coastal state under
principles of international law.
40. H. LAUTERPACHT, Rules of Warfare in an Unlawful War, in LAW AND POLTICS IN
THE WORLD COmmUNiTY 89 (A. Lipsky ed. 1953).
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 36 para. 3.
42. Convention signed at Constantinople (1888), LXXIX B.F.S.P. 18 (1887-1888).
43. See Selak, A Consideration of the Legal Status oj the Gulf of Aqaba, 52 AM. J. INT'L
L. 660 (1958).
44. See note 42 ART. X, supra.
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IV. THE STRAITS OF TIRAN: INNOCENT PASSAGE DURING
A TIME OF PEACE?
A. Elath
It has been pointed out that the United Arab Republic does not
recognize Israel's claims to Elath.4 Though a discussion of historical
claims and boundary disputes is beyond the scope of this comment, it
does not seem likely that, in the light of events subsequent to 1949, Israel
will be required by international law to give up Elath. Even if she were
found not to have a legal right to Elath, however, she would still claim
the right of innocent passage along with other sea-faring nations, though
it is obvious that her interest in the Gulf for fishing and trading reasons
would probably be rather small.
B. Mare Clausum and Other Historical Claims
The United Arab Republic's assertion of a right to suspend the
passage of strategic cargoes bound for Israel would be justified if the
Gulf of Aqaba were an Arab inland sea (mare clausum), or an historic
bay. Saudi Arabia has advanced this argument in support of Arab claims
of sovereignty over the Gulf.4 6 Such an argument is, however, faulty.
Alexander Melamid, a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society,
states that "[r] esearch supports the view that navigation rights have defi-
nitely been established in the Gulf of Aqaba by nations other than the
Arab states." '47 He points out that the prevalance of strong northerly
winds rendered navigation in the Gulf extremely difficult and that such
navigation was rare before the advent of steam navigation. The first
steam vessels to use the Gulf were British, and the first and all subse-
quent surveys of the Gulf are British. France claimed the Isle de Graye,
lying in the Gulf, as early as 1115 A.D.4" Arab claims of the use of the
Gulf as an historical path for Moslem pilgrims are equally unfounded.
Melamid notes that "[d]ue to the existence of motorable tracks in the
Sinai Peninsula, Egypt makes virtually no use of the Gulf."
In the case of San Salvador v. Nicaragua5° the International Court
of the Central American Republics held that the Bay of Fonseca was an
"historical bay" because all of the littoral states had given it such a char-
acter for a period of several hundred years.5 1 In the Gulf of Aqaba, "no
formal closed-sea claim apears ever to have been made until that asserted
45. See notes 8-10 supra.
46. R. BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 162 (1964).
47. A. Melamid, Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 412 (1959).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 11 A.J. 693, 700-717 (1917).
51. Id.
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by the Saudi Arabian government early in 1957."52 Prior to this claim,
the Gulf had been declared international in character by the general body
of the world nations." On January 15, 1957, prior to the Saudi Arabian
claim, the United Nations Secretary General stated to the General
Assembly that "the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba may
be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits
of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of Interna-
tional law."154 In addition, if Israel's claim to Elath be upheld, Israel was a
littoral state at the time the Saudi Arabian claim was made, and, therefore,
all the littoral states have not claimed the Gulf to be a mare clausum, or
historic bay.
C: Aqaba: A Slice of High Seas?
Every major convention on the law of the territorial sea since the
1930 Convention at the Hague has recognized the right of innocent pass-
age through straits connecting two parts of the high seas.5 This right is
reiterated in article 18(4) of the 1956 International Law Commission Re-
port on the Territorial Sea. The Article states: "There must be no suspen-
sion of the innocent passage of foreign vessels through straits normally
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas."56
It is clear then, that if the Gulf of Aqaba contains high seas, the Straits
of Tiran, which connect Aqaba to the Red Sea, connect two parts of the
high seas, and there can be no suspension of innocent passage through
them.
The Gulf is over one hundred miles long and is seventeen miles wide
at its broadest point. 7 In 1957, each of the four littoral states claimed a
territorial sea extending six miles from its shoreline. 8 These claims left an
area or a "slice," about five miles wide in the center of the Gulf which
could properly be termed "high seas."59 Thus, in 1957, Tiran connected
two parts of the high seas, and innocent passage could not have been
suspended through it.
52. See note 35 at 692 supra.
53. 11 U.N. GAOR 1287-1288 (1957).
54. 11 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66 para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/3500 (1957).
55. 1930 Hague Conference Draft on the Legal Status of the Territorial Sea; 1956
Int'l Law Comm'n Report on the Territorial Sea, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/2934
(1956); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L.52 (1958).
56. Int'l Law Comm'n Report, art. 18(4), 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/2934
(1956).
57. Selak, A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 52 Am. J. INT'L L.
660, 667 (1958).
58. Decree No. 6/4/5/3711, May 28, 1949, Umm al-Qura (Mecca), May 29, 1949,
I U.N.L.S. 89 (1951) (Saudi Arabia); Decree of Jan. 15, 1951, 78 al-Waqayih al-Misriyoh
6, I U.N.L.S. 307 (1951) (Egypt); Fisheries Act No. 25 of December 2, 1943, U.N.L.S. 552
(1957) (Jordan); Territorial Waters Decree of 24 Elul 5715 (Sept. 11, 1955), U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/99/Add. 1, p. 16 (1956) (Israel).
59. I OPPENHEXm, INiTERNATIONAL LAW 487 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht 1955).
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In 1958, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic extended
their territorial seas to a width of twelve miles eachY0 The validity of
these claims has not yet been determined; however, if they are upheld,
the area of high seas within Aqaba would become a part of the territorial
seas of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic, and the entire char-
acter of the Gulf would be altered. It does not seem, however, that such
claims will be upheld.
In the Norwegian Fisheries case in 1951, the International Court of
Justice stated: "The delimitation of sea areas has always had an inter-
national aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal
state . . . the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states de-
pends upon international law."8' The court then held that a coastal state
may not extend its territorial sea if such extension is prejudicial to the
rights of another sea-faring nation. 2 Clearly, the extensions are prejudi-
cial to Israel in that they would exempt the Straits of Tiran from the rule
of international law which forbids the suspension of innocent passage
through straits connecting two parts of the high seas."
It should be made clear that the above rule regards the suspension
of innocent passage. There is little dispute that if the passage is not in-
nocent, it can be suspended. 4 Under the Geneva Convention, a broad
definition is given to "innocent passage," namely passage which is "not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state."8
The International Law Commission, which codified principles of interna-
tional law, and whose draft was the basis of the Geneva 'Convention, re-
stricted non-innocent passage to cases where the ship was actually com-
mitting acts against the coastal state. 8 Even under the broad Geneva
definition, however, the carriage of cargo to Israel during a time of peace
under a United Nations armistice, could not be said to be prejudicial. For
such carriage to be prejudicial, a state of war would have to exist. 7
The legality of the United Arab Republic's measures, then, clearly
depends on the existence of a state of war, during which passage would
be prejudicial, or on the right to suspend innocent passage during a time
of peace. It was shown, as to the latter, that no such right exists if the
Gulf of Aqaba contains a "slice of high seas."
60. Saudi Arabian Decree No. 33 defining the Territorial Waters of the Kingdom
(Feb. 16, 1958), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/8 (1959); Presidential Decree of Feb. 17,
1958, No. 180, reported in 14 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 406-407 (1958)
(U.A.R.).
61. Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom-Norway) [1951] I.C.J. 116.
62. Id., at 118.
63. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
64. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva, April
29, 1958, ART. 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L.52.
65. Id., ART. 14(4).
66. Int'l Law Comm'n Report, art. 17(1), 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956).
67. See discussion under III, pp. 874-78 supra.
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D. Innocent Passage to Territorial Seas?
Article 16(4) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone6 extended the rule regarding none-suspension of in-
nocent passage through straits connecting two parts of the high seas
69
to include non-suspension even when the straits connect one part of the
high seas to the territorial sea of a foreign state. The United Arab Re-
public, however, was not a party to that convention ° and cannot be bound
by such a provision unless it is an expression of a general principle of
international law. Leo Gross points out that there is authority that it is
not.7 Such an argument is supported by the express purpose of the Con-
vention itself, namely to consider "not only ...the legal but also ...
the technical, biological, economic and political aspects of the problem.)
72
Article 16(4) is one of the very few provisions that differ from the pro-
visions of the International Law Commission draft, the express purpose
of which was to codify existing principles of customary international law.7"
Therefore, it seems that article 16(4) is an expression of the policy of the
signatory nations rather than a rule of international law.
The conclusion is clear. If Aqaba is comprised only of the territorial
waters of the coastal states,74 no rule of international law prevents the
suspension of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the
United Arab Republic's measure were legal.
E. The Right to Regulate Passage
International law gives the coastal state the right to regulate passage
through its territorial waters.75 Thus an argument could be made that a
right of visit and search is justified as a regulatory right of the coastal
state. This argument fails, however, because the burden is on the coastal
state to show that such a measure is reasonable and customary, and re-
search reveals that regulatory rights include measures such as merely the
requirement of prior notification.7" Visit, search, and seizure is a belliger-
ent act, not a peace-time regulatory right.
77
68. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. A/CoNr. 13/L.52.
69. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
70. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. A/CorF. 13/L 52.
71. Gross, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent
Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 564, 593 (1959).
72. G.A. RES. 1105 (XI), 2 U.N. GAOR 2265 (1957).
73. International Law Comm'n Report, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/925
(1949).
74. See discussion pp. 880-81 supra.
75. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Signed at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, ART. 14(4), U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 52; see also dicta in the Corfu
Channel Case (United Kingdom-Albania) [1949] I.C.J. 4, 29-30.
76. E. HAMBRO, IV-A THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 249-250
(1960).
77. See note 17 supra.
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F. Estoppel
The legality of the United Arab Republic's measures in the Straits
becomes doubtful in the face of a guarantee that she made through her
United Nations representative in 1957, when she occupied the islands of
Tiran and Sanifir. Egypt said that passage in the Straits would "remain
free as in the past. .. .
The common law concept of estoppel had its roots in a broader con-
cept which still exists in international law, viz., venire contra factum
proprium non valet.79 Under this doctrine, reliance by other nations is not
even required. Simply stated, the doctrine precludes a state from denying
the existence of any right which that state has previously recognized "by
its representation, its declaration, its conduct, or its silence. . . ."" This
doctrine is perhaps restrained by the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, or
"changed circumstances."'" The latter is applied only in exceptional cir-
cumstances and usually in regard to treaty obligations, however. 82 In the
absence of exceptional circumstances, such as Israel's renouncing the
Rhodes Armistice, the United Arab Republic should be bound by her 1957
guarantee of free passage in the Straits of Tiran. Apparently there were
no exceptional circumstances.83
V. CONCLUSION
Israel, then, will not withdraw from the Sinai unless there is a
guarantee that there will be a settlement of, inter alia, her rights of
passage in the Straits of Tiran. This review of the legal considerations
that will go into any settlement shows the great complexity of the ques-
tion. It does seem, however, that the international interest at stake in the
Gulf of Aqaba will lead the International Court of Justice to find that
innocent passage does exist through the Straits during a time of peace. On
the other hand, it seems equally clear that the coastal state-whether it is
the United Arab Republic or Israel-will have a belligerent right of visit,
search, and seizure and the right to suspend passage that is not innocent
during a time of war. The choice is clear: a permanent peace settlement
and innocent passage, or an endless war.
78. 36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 389 (1957).
79. "To go against one's own act is not valid." The International Court of Justice
applied the doctrine in Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia-Thailand) [1962] I.C.J. 40.
80. E. HAMBRO, IV-B TnE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 851
(1966).
81. See discussion in Treaties for the Protection of Minorities 36, 71, U.N. Doc. E/CN.
4/367 (1950). Literally translated, rebus sic stantibus means "at this point of affairs."
82. Id.
83. Factual accounts relate the United Arab Republic's measures as unilateral and
describe no provocative act by Israel; see, e.g., notes 2 and 4 supra.
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